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Abstract
We consider a principal-agent contracting problem between a seller and a buyer, where the buyer
has single-dimensional private information. The buyer’s type is assumed to be continuously dis-
tributed on a closed interval. The seller designs a menu of finitely many contracts by pooling the
buyer types a priori using a partition scheme. He maximises either his minimum utility, his expected
utility, or a combination of both (a multi-objective approach). For each variation, we determine
tractable reformulations and the optimal menu of contracts under certain conditions.
These results are applied to a contracting problem with quadratic utilities. We show that the
optimal objective value is completely determined by the partition scheme, a single aggregate instance
parameter, and a parameter encoding the seller’s guaranteed obtained utility. This enables us to
derive the optimal partition and exact performance guarantees. Our analysis shows that the seller
should always offer at least two contracts in order to have reasonable performance guarantees, re-
sulting in at least 88% of the expected utility compared to offering infinitely many contracts. By
also optimising obtained worst-case utility, he can potentially achieve only 64% of the maximum
expected utility.
Keywords: mechanism design, asymmetric information, pooling of contracts, multi-objective op-
timisation
1 Introduction
We consider a principal-agent problem where the principal is a seller of products and where the agent is
a potential buyer. The seller has the initiative and market power to make a one-time offer to the buyer
in which he presents a menu of contracts. We assume that this is a take-it-or-leave-it offer, i.e., we do
not consider repeated offers or renegotiations. Each contract specifies an order quantity x ∈ R≥0 and a
side payment z ∈ R from the buyer to the seller. The buyer has the market power to accept or reject
any contract from the menu. Furthermore, we assume that both the seller and the buyer act individually
rationally and want to maximise their own utility. Thus, the buyer will accept an offered contract if this
is most beneficial to himself.
The buyer has private information that he does not share with the seller. We consider the case where
the buyer’s private information can be encoded into a single-dimensional parameter p, referred to as the
buyer’s type. We assume that the buyer’s type can take on values in [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R with p¯ >
¯
p and follows
a continuous distribution with strictly positive density function ω : [
¯
p, p¯] → R>0. Although the buyer’s
type is private, this distribution is known to the seller.
The seller has utility function φS : R≥0 → R for an order quantity and his net utility also includes the
side payment. Thus, if the buyer accepts a contract (x, z), the resulting seller’s net utility is φS(x) + z.
Likewise, a buyer with type p has utility function φB(·|p) : R≥0 → R. His net utility for contract (x, z)
is φB(x|p) − z. If the buyer rejects all contracts, we assume that his net utility is zero, which is also
known as the buyer’s reservation level.
Due to the buyer’s private information, the seller can and will use Mechanism Design to construct
a menu of contracts for the buyer to choose from. For a general reference on Mechanism Design for
contracting problems, see for example Laffont and Martimort (2002). We consider the case where the
seller only offers a limited number of contracts, similar to the Robust Pooling approach in our earlier
work Kerkkamp et al. (2017). That is, the seller first decides how many contracts are offered, indicated
by K ∈ N≥1. For notational convenience, let K = {1, . . . ,K}. Second, the seller partitions [
¯
p, p¯] into
K subintervals [
¯
pk, p¯k] with p¯k >
¯
pk for k ∈ K. Such a partition is called a proper K-partition. Third,
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the seller constructs a menu of K contracts by solving a specific optimisation model, given below, which
depends on the chosen partition. Finally, this menu is offered to the buyer.
From this point onwards, we refer to a contract by (xk, zk) with k ∈ K and to a menu of contracts by
(x, z), where x = (x1, . . . , xK) and z = (z1, . . . , zK). The menu is designed such that for each k ∈ K it
is for all types in [
¯
pk, p¯k] most beneficial to choose contract (xk, zk). We have the following constraints
for the menu:
φB(xk|pk)− zk ≥ 0, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k ∈ K, (1)
φB(xk|pk)− zk ≥ φB(xl|pk)− zl, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k, l ∈ K, (2)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K. (3)
Constraints (3) simply enforce non-negative order quantities. The other constraints (1) and (2) affect
which contract the buyer will choose. Constraints (1) ensure individual rationality (IR) for the buyer:
for k ∈ K and pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] contract (xk, zk) must not give a lower net utility than the buyer’s reservation
level. If (1) does not hold, then type pk will never accept contract (xk, zk). We make the conventional
assumption that if the buyer has multiple options which all maximise his net utility, then the seller
can convince the buyer to choose from these the most beneficial option to the seller. Consequently,
(1) guarantees that all types will choose a contract from the menu. Constraints (2) ensure for k ∈ K
that contract (xk, zk) has the highest net utility for all types in [
¯
pk, p¯k]. This is known as incentive
compatibility (IC).
Thus, for a menu satisfying constraints (1)-(3) contract (xk, zk) is chosen by all types [
¯
pk, p¯k]. In
other words, contract (xk, zk) is chosen by the buyer with probability
ωk ≡
∫ p¯k
¯
pk
ω(p)dp ∀ k ∈ K. (4)
We consider two objective functions for the seller subject to constraints (1)-(3): he maximises either
his expected net utility or his minimum net utility. With the above insight, the seller’s expected net
utility is given by ∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + zk) . (5)
This leads to the Maximise Expected net utility (ME) model: max{(5) : (1)-(3)}. Similarly, the seller’s
minimum net utility is
min
k∈K
(φS(xk) + zk) , (6)
resulting in the Maximise Minimum net utility (MM) model: max{(6) : (1)-(3)}.
It turns out that for a broad class of problems the MM model has multiple optimal solutions, as we
will show. The seller can therefore choose from these optimal solutions based on a second criterion. In
light of the seller’s desire to maximise his utility, we consider the case that the seller selects the optimal
MM solution with maximum expected net utility. This can be interpreted as a two-stage optimisation
approach based on the MM and ME models.
In fact, we generalise this two-stage approach to a multi-objective approach by adding the constraint
mink∈K(φS(xk) + zk) ≥M , or equivalently
φS(xk) + zk ≥M, ∀ k ∈ K, (7)
to the ME model for some parameter M ∈ R. We note that (7) is also known as the seller ’s individual
rationality constraint, where M is the seller’s reservation level. We call the resulting model the Multi-
Objective (MO) model: max{(5) : (7), (1)-(3)}. Notice that by choosing M sufficiently small/negative (7)
is non-restrictive and the MO model becomes the ME model. Likewise, by setting M to the optimal MM
objective value, the MO model has the above described two-stage interpretation and finds the optimal
MM solution with maximum expected net utility. Hence, the parameter M allows the seller to analyse
the trade-off between maximising expected or worst-case net utility in a multi-objective perspective.
We shall refer to the MM, ME, and MO models as pooling models in general. Our goal is to analyse
these pooling models, determine the optimal solutions analytically, and apply the results to a concrete
contracting problem. In particular, we want to analytically quantify the effect of pooling the buyer types,
the chosen partition scheme, and the buyer’s reservation level M .
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1.1 Literature
In the MM model the seller maximises his minimum net utility, which is often called having a ‘maximin’
objective or being ambiguity averse in the literature. Here, the minimum is taken over all offered
contracts or, equivalently, over all possible realisations of the buyer’s type. Only the support [
¯
p, p¯] of
the distribution ω is needed. This is an extreme case of recent Robust Optimisation approaches to
Mechanism Design, see for example Bergemann and Schlag (2011) and Pınar and Kızılkale (2016). In
these models the minimum is taken over an uncertainty set for ω, e.g., the distribution ω cannot differ
too much from a reference distribution. The resulting robust model is typically less conservative than
the classical maximim model. For further references on using Robust Optimisation, see Aghassi and
Bertsimas (2006), Ben-Tal et al. (2009) and Bergemann and Morris (2005).
Our pooling approach can be viewed as a different application of Robust Optimisation. Consider the
classical discrete variant of the contracting problem (see for example Laffont and Martimort (2002)).
Here, the buyer’s type lies in the set {p1, . . . , pK} and follows a discrete distribution. If we associate an
uncertainty set [
¯
pk, p¯k] to type pk, then our pooling model is the Robust Optimisation variant for the
discrete model. By considering a continuum of types [
¯
p, p¯] and using a partition scheme, we are in fact
restricting the uncertainty sets [
¯
pk, p¯k] to form a partition of [
¯
p, p¯].
A property of the pooling approach is to offer finitely many contracts to a continuum of buyer types.
There are to our knowledge two papers in the literature that are strongly connected to this approach:
Bergemann et al. (2011) and Wong (2014).
Bergemann et al. (2011) consider a linear-quadratic model with limited communication between the
seller and the buyer based on Mussa and Rosen (1978). The seller wants to maximise his expected net
utility. The limited communication restricts the seller to using a menu with finitely many contracts. In
contrast to our pooling approach, they do not partition the types a priori. Instead, their menu maps each
buyer type to one of the K contracts without any restrictions. By reformulating the problem into a mean
square minimisation problem and applying Quantisation theory, they are able to determine the optimal
menu of contracts and the corresponding optimal mapping of buyer types to contracts. In particular,
their results show that the restriction to K contracts leads to a loss in performance of the order Θ(1/K2)
compared to offering infinitely many contracts.
Wong (2014) uses the same modelling approach as Bergemann et al. (2011), but analyses a more
general non-linear pricing problem (again maximising the seller’s expected net utility). His analysis
focusses on the loss in performance when restricting to K contracts instead of infinitely many contracts.
In particular, he derives the same Θ(1/K2) loss in performance as Bergemann et al. (2011), but under
a more general setting.
For the ME model we have shown in Kerkkamp et al. (2017) that the pooling approach and those
of Bergemann et al. (2011) and Wong (2014) are equivalent provided that we use the K-partition of
[
¯
p, p¯] that maximises the seller’s expected net utility. That is, both approaches lead to partitioning the
buyer types. However, as argued in Kerkkamp et al. (2017) and Wong (2014) determining the optimal
K-partition is difficult in general. In case the optimal partition cannot be derived, the benefit of our
pooling approach is that it allows for heuristic partition schemes in a simple and controlled way. As
we will show, the complexity of the pooling models for a given partition is similar to classical discrete
contracting models.
The previously discussed papers do not consider multi-objective optimisation. In terms of using a
multi-objective approach, Zheng et al. (2015) has to our knowledge the strongest connection to our work.
Zheng et al. (2015) consider a continuum of types [
¯
p, p¯] and the seller offers a menu with infinitely many
contracts, i.e., there is no a priori pooling. They suppose that the seller is not confident about the
probability distribution ω and model this by a so-called -contamination: with probability 0 ≤  ≤ 1
the distribution ω is incorrect and the worst-case outcome of ω occurs. Consequently, the objective
function is the weighted sum of the seller’s expected net utility and the seller’s minimum net utility. The
assumed utility functions are φS(x) = −cx and φB(x|p) = pχ(x), where χ is a strictly increasing, positive,
and continuously differentiable concave function. Furthermore, the distribution ω has a non-decreasing
hazard rate. They show that for 0 <  < 1 the optimal menu effectively pools the types [
¯
p, p∗()] for
some
¯
p < p∗() < p¯ and offers those types the same contract. For the types (p∗(), p¯] infinitely many
contracts are offered.
To compare their multi-objective approach to ours, we translate the model of Zheng et al. (2015) to
our pooling setting. For given 0 ≤  ≤ 1 the resulting model is to maximize
(1− )
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + zk) + min
k∈K
(φS(xk) + zk)
3
R.B.O. Kerkkamp & W. van den Heuvel & A.P.M. Wagelmans
subject to (1)-(3) with variables x and z. This is equivalent to maximising
(1− )
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + zk) + M
subject to (7) and (1)-(3) with variables x, z, and M . We refer to this model as the weighted objective
model. Although this model is very similar to our MO model, there are differences. The most obvious
difference is that for  = 1 the weighted objective model is our MM model, not our MO model (with cor-
rectly corresponding M). In this case, our MO model is a two-stage optimisation model which determines
the optimal MM solution that maximises the seller’s expected net utility. Typically, the MM model has
multiple optimal solutions, whereas the MO model has just one (as we will show later). Furthermore,
the parameter M in the MO model has a natural interpretation, namely the seller’s reservation level. A
similar interpretation of  only follows indirectly after solving the weighted objective model and observing
the corresponding optimal M . We will discuss further similarities and differences in more detail during
our analysis.
Besides solving the pooling models for given number of contracts K, partition scheme, and seller’s
reservation level M , we want to quantify the effect of these choices on the corresponding optimal objective
values. Due to the complexity we focus on a concrete contracting problem for such an analysis: the
Linear-Quadratic-Uniform (LQU) problem adapted from Wong (2014). For the ME model variant of
the LQU problem we also refer to Kerkkamp et al. (2017), where we completed the analysis of Wong
(2014). Since the MO model generalises the ME model, our results in this paper supersede the mentioned
analyses of the LQU problem. Furthermore, we are able to relate results for the LQU problem to Zheng
et al. (2015).
1.2 Contribution
We analyse a contracting problem where the seller offers a menu of finitely many contracts to a buyer
with a continuum [
¯
p, p¯] of types. Here, the seller uses a partition scheme to pool the types a priori.
Moreover, we consider a multi-objective approach for the seller’s objective function which balances
expected and worst-case (minimum) net utility. Compared to the literature, we extend related work by
either considering a multi-objective approach (Bergemann et al. (2011) and Wong (2014)) or by pooling
the buyer types with a partition scheme (Zheng et al. (2015)). Furthermore, there are differences in the
modelling approaches as discussed in Section 1.1.
Under commonly used assumptions, we derive tractable reformulations for the pooling models and
determine the optimal menu of contracts. The optimal menus all turn out to be the maxima of certain
modified joint net utility functions. We apply and extend these results to a concrete contracting problem,
namely the LQU problem. In particular, we derive the optimal partition scheme for the LQU problem
and the corresponding optimal objective values. Consequently, we can analyse various performance
measures that quantify the effect of the number of contracts K offered and of the seller’s reservation
level M . This leads to performance guarantees that give insight into the trade-off between maximising
expected or worst-case net utility. All results are analytical and expressed in closed-form formulas.
The remainder of this paper starts with the general analysis of the pooling models in Section 2,
followed by the application to the LQU problem in Section 3. We conclude our findings in Section 4.
2 General analysis
In this section we analyse the three pooling models in detail. First, we present the essential details of
the setting and the three models in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we derive tractable reformulations for the
models under a common assumption on the buyer’s utility function. Finally, we determine the optimal
solution of the models for a broad class of problems in Section 2.3. All corresponding proofs are given
in Appendix A.
2.1 The models
As introduced in Section 1, we consider a seller with utility function φS : R≥0 → R and a buyer with
utility function φB(·|p) : R≥0 → R for type p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R. The joint utility function is denoted by
φJ(·|p) ≡ φS(·) + φB(·|p). The buyer’s type follows a continuous distribution with strictly positive
density function ω : [
¯
p, p¯]→ R>0. The seller offers the buyer a menu with a limited number of contracts
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by pooling the buyer types a priori. In this menu, the k-th contract (xk, zk) specifies the order quantity
xk ∈ R≥0 and the side payment zk ∈ R from the buyer to the seller. First, the seller chooses the
number of contracts K ∈ N≥1 to offer. Second, the seller partitions [
¯
p, p¯] into K subintervals [
¯
pk, p¯k]
with p¯k >
¯
pk for k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K}, leading to aggregate probabilities ωk for k ∈ K given by (4).
Given this partition/pooling scheme, the seller constructs a menu of K contracts by solving one of our
pooling models: the MM model max{(6) : (1)-(3)}, the ME model max{(5) : (1)-(3)}, or the MO model
max{(5) : (7), (1)-(3)}.
We focus on the MO model:
max
x,z
∑
k∈K
ωk (φS(xk) + zk) ,
s.t. φS(xk) + zk ≥M, ∀ k ∈ K, (7)
φB(xk|pk)− zk ≥ 0, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k ∈ K, (1)
φB(xk|pk)− zk ≥ φB(xl|pk)− zl, ∀ pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k], k, l ∈ K, (2)
xk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K. (3)
The MO model maximises the seller’s expected net utility under individual rationality constraints for
the seller (7) and the buyer (1), and under incentive compatibility constraints (2). Note that the buyer’s
reservation level in (1) is assumed to be zero, whereas the seller’s reservation level M ∈ R in (7) is set
by the seller. With the parameter M the seller can balance his expected net utility with his minimum
net utility. In particular, by an appropriate choice of M we can solve the ME or MM model with the
MO model. That is, if we increase M then the optimal solution transitions from an optimal ME solution
to an optimal MM solution. As a final note, if M is too large, then the MO model is infeasible. These
insights will be made more concrete in the following analysis.
2.2 Tractable reformulation
In order to obtain tractable reformulations of our models and the results to come, we need to assume
additional structure on the buyer’s utility function. Assumption 1 states that φB is non-decreasing in
the buyer’s type and satisfies the strictly increasing differences property.
Assumption 1. The buyer’s utility function φB satisfies the following properties:
φB(x|λ) ≤ φB(x|µ) ∀λ ≤ µ ∈ R, x ≥ 0, (8)
φB(x
′|λ)− φB(x|λ) < φB(x′|µ)− φB(x|µ) ∀λ < µ ∈ R, 0 ≤ x < x′. (9)
Note that we implicitly assume that φB(·|λ) is defined for all λ ∈ R, not just for [
¯
p, p¯]. However, it
follows from the proofs that we only need to consider 2K instance-dependent values for λ. Assumption 1,
or the stronger Single-Crossing Condition, is common in the Mechanism Design literature and leads to
non-decreasingness in the order quantities with respect to the buyer’s type (see also Edlin and Shannon
(1998), Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Schottmu¨ller (2015)). This is also the case for the pooling
models, as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, any x satisfies (1)-(3) if and only if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK .
Furthermore, for fixed order quantities x, the IR and IC constraints (1) and (2) imply a dual shortest
path problem structure on the side payments z. For non-pooling models this has been identified before,
see for example Rochet and Stole (2003) and Vohra (2012). For our pooling models, the side payments
are even more restricted, leading to the optimal formulas for z given in Lemma 2. In fact, we only need
to assume (8) for this result, but we have chosen to merge certain assumptions for readability.
Lemma 2. Consider the ME, MM, or MO model under Assumption 1. It is necessary and sufficient
for optimality to set
zk = φB(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) ∀ k ∈ K. (10)
With Lemma 2 we can eliminate the side payments from our models. Using Lemma 1 we can then
simplify the constraints from infinitely many to K linear constraints. This results in the tractable
reformulations as shown in Theorem 3. Recall that φJ(·|p) is the joint utility function with respect to
type p.
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Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, the ME model is equivalent to
max
0≤x1≤···≤xK
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
(
φB(xk|p¯k)− φB(xk|
¯
pk)
) K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
)
, (11)
the MM model to
max
0≤x1≤···≤xK
min
k∈K
(
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
))
, (12)
and the MO model to
max
x
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
(
φB(xk|p¯k)− φB(xk|
¯
pk)
) K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
)
, (13)
s.t. φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) ≥M, ∀ k ∈ K, (14)
xK ≥ · · · ≥ x1 ≥ 0. (15)
From the reformulations it is clear that the complexity of solving our pooling models depends on the
shape of φJ(·|
¯
pk) and of φB(·|p¯k) − φB(·|
¯
pk) for k ∈ K. For example, if φJ(·|
¯
pk) is differentiable and
concave, and if φB(·|p¯k) − φB(·|
¯
pk) is linear, then all three models are concave optimisation problems
with differential functions, which can be solved numerically in an efficient way. We focus on classifying
problems for which the optimal solutions can be described in a unified way.
2.3 Optimal solutions
The next assumption excludes situations where the seller could potentially achieve infinite utility from
the menu of contracts, see Assumption 2.
Assumption 2. For any λ ∈ R the joint utility function φJ(·|λ) has a maximum on R≥0 and on any
closed subinterval of R≥0.
In Assumption 2, the existence of a maximum on any closed subinterval of R≥0 is needed because of
a technicality (see the proof of Lemma 4 to come). In particular, Assumption 2 is satisfied if φS and φB
are continuous functions in the order quantity.
The maximum of φJ(·|λ) for specific values of λ has a central role in the optimal solutions for our
models. Therefore, we have an intermediate result on the maximisers of φJ(·|λ), see Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1-2, there exists a non-decreasing function M∗ : R→ R such that
M∗(λ) ≡ max
x≥0
{φJ(x|λ)}.
For M ≤M∗(
¯
p), there exists a non-decreasing function x∗(·|M) : R→ R≥0 such that
x∗(λ|M) ≡ min argmax
x≥xM
{φJ(x|λ)},
where xM ∈ R≥0 is given by xM ≡ min
{
x ≥ 0 : φJ(x|
¯
p) ≥M}.
Recall that the seller’s reservation level M only affects the MO model. For the MM and ME models,
we can implicitly use an non-restrictive value for M , namely M = −∞. For M = −∞ we have xM = 0,
hence x∗(λ|M) optimises over the entire domain x ≥ 0. In this case we simplify our notation and use
x∗(λ) instead of x∗(λ|−∞). We can now express the optimal solution for the MM model, see Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1-2, the optimal objective value for the MM model is M∗(
¯
p), which
can be attained by offering a menu with a single contract with order quantity x∗(
¯
p). Note that this does
not depend on the partition of [
¯
p, p¯]. Another optimal solution is xk = x
∗(
¯
pk) for k ∈ K, which does
depend on the partition.
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A consequence of Theorem 5 is that the complexity of solving the MM model is completely determined
by the complexity of maximising φJ(x|
¯
p) over x ≥ 0. For a similar result for the ME and MO models,
we need the assumption that each k-th term in the objective function can be written as φJ(xk|λk) for
some λk non-decreasing in k. This assumption is formalised in Assumption 3.
Assumption 3. The density function ω and the buyer’s utility function φB are such that there exist
parameters pik ∈ R for k ∈ K satisfying pi1 ≤ · · · ≤ piK and
φB(x|pik) = φB(x|
¯
pk)−
(
φB(x|p¯k)− φB(x|
¯
pk)
) K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
∀x ≥ 0, k ∈ K. (16)
The parameters pik are strongly related to the virtual valuation of the buyer types (see e.g. Laffont
and Martimort (2002)). Under Assumptions 1 and 3 it is trivial to show that pik <
¯
pk for all k ∈ K\{K}
and piK ≤
¯
pK (see the proof of Theorem 7 to come). In Appendix B we present an example problem class
for which we prove that it satisfies Assumption 3 and provide a closed-form expression for pik. In the
example, the buyer’s utility function is φB(x|p) = ψ(x) + pχ(x) for some functions ψ and χ, where χ is
strictly increasing and non-negative. Furthermore, ω is a continuous distribution with a non-decreasing
hazard rate, e.g., the uniform distribution.
Under the additional assumption, we can derive the optimal solution for the ME model as shown in
Theorem 6.
Theorem 6. Under Assumptions 1-3, an optimal solution for the ME model is xk = x
∗(pik) for k ∈ K.
Compared to the MM model, where an optimal solution is given by the maximisers of φJ(·|
¯
pk) for
k ∈ K, an optimal ME solution is specified by the maximisers of φJ(·|pik). In other words, we need to
shift the buyer types downwards from
¯
pk to pik.
Last but not least, we have the optimal solution for the MO model. The MO model maximises the
seller’s expected net utility under the constraint that the seller’s minimum net utility is at least his
reservation level M . From Theorem 5 we know that the minimum net utility is at most M∗(
¯
p), being
the optimal objective value of the MM model. Therefore, any seller’s reservation level M ≤ M∗(
¯
p) can
be satisfied and any M > M∗(
¯
p) is infeasible. Theorem 7 states the optimal MO solution.
Theorem 7. Under Assumptions 1-3, the MO model is feasible if and only if M ≤ M∗(
¯
p), and an
optimal solution for the MO model is xk = x
∗(pik|M) for k ∈ K.
In particular, if the seller sets M = M∗(
¯
p), then the MO model is a two-stage optimisation which
maximises first the seller’s minimum net utility and second the seller’s expected net utility. Hence, under
Assumptions 1-3 we have identified a third optimal MM solution. This leads to the next straightforward
corollary.
Corollary 8. Under Assumptions 1-3, if for each k ∈ K the function
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
)
is concave on xK ≥ · · · ≥ x1 ≥ 0, then any convex combination of
xk = x
∗(
¯
p) ∀ k ∈ K,
xk = x
∗(
¯
pk) ∀ k ∈ K,
xk = x
∗(pik|M∗(
¯
p)) ∀ k ∈ K,
is an optimal solution for the MM model.
Returning to Theorem 7, if φJ(·|λ) is concave, then the optimal MO solution can be found in two
steps as follows. First, determine the optimal ME solution by using the shifted buyer types pik, resulting
in xk = x
∗(pik) for k ∈ K. Second, set any xk < xM to the threshold order quantity xM in order to
guarantee the seller’s reservation level M . Zheng et al. (2015) derive a similar solution structure for their
concave setting with infinitely many contracts, where the types [
¯
p, p∗] for some
¯
p < p∗ < p¯ are offered the
same contract (like xM in our case). Returning to our result, the threshold xM could lead to additional
pooling of types as multiple contracts can specify the order quantity xM . This implies that the original
partition of [
¯
p, p¯] can be improved to increase the seller’s expected net utility.
7
R.B.O. Kerkkamp & W. van den Heuvel & A.P.M. Wagelmans
This brings us to one of the decisions the seller has to make: the partition of [
¯
p, p¯]. Based on our
results, we have the following strategy for the seller. First, the seller must determine the optimal MM
objective value M∗(
¯
p), which is independent of the partition. Second, he must decide on his reservation
level M ≤ M∗(
¯
p). Third, he chooses the number of contracts K offered. Finally, the seller selects a
partition and uses the above results to determine an optimal menu of contracts for the MO model.
Ideally, the seller optimises the partition such that his expected net utility is maximised. Unfortu-
nately, such optimisation appears to be difficult in general. Given the complexity of the analysis, we focus
on the so-called Linear-Quadratic-Uniform (LQU) problem adapted from Wong (2014). In Section 3 we
derive the optimal partition and analyse performance guarantees for the LQU problem.
3 Application to the LQU problem
In this section, we apply the results of Section 2 to a concrete contracting problem, called the Linear-
Quadratic-Uniform (LQU) problem. We formalise the LQU problem in Section 3.1 and translate our
general results from Section 2 to this setting in Section 3.2. In Sections 3.3-3.5 we continue the analysis,
derive the optimal partition, and determine performance guarantees when using the optimal partition.
All corresponding proofs are given in Appendix C.
3.1 The Linear-Quadratic-Uniform problem
In the Linear-Quadratic-Uniform (LQU) problem, the seller’s utility function is linear in the order
quantity: φS(x) = Px, where P ∈ R>0 is the seller’s utility per unit of sold product. The buyer’s utility
function is characterised by a saturation effect: the marginal utility of buying an additional product
decreases linearly. That is, for order quantity x ∈ R≥0 the buyer’s marginal utility of an additional
product is p − rx. Here, p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] ⊆ R>0 with p¯ >
¯
p is the buyer’s (private) type and r ∈ R>0 is
a saturation rate parameter. Note that p is strictly positive. The buyer’s type is assumed to have a
uniform distribution, i.e., ω(p) = 1/(p¯−
¯
p). Consequently, the buyer’s utility function is
φB(x|p) =
∫ x
0
(p− ru)du = px− 12rx2.
Notice that for large order quantities the buyer’s utility is negative, which models for example that excess
products must be disposed of at a cost. Furthermore, ordering no products leads to zero utility for the
buyer, which is his reservation level.
The pooling of contracts for the LQU problem has been analysed in Wong (2014) and under the name
DMU-1 in Kerkkamp et al. (2017), both with the goal to maximise the seller’s expected net utility (the
ME model). As mentioned in Section 1, we extend the analysis to the MO model, with which we can
balance the maximisation of the seller’s worst-case and expected net utility.
3.2 Optimal solutions
It is straightforward to verify that the LQU problem satisfies Assumptions 1-3 of Section 2. In particular,
since ω is the uniform density function we have
ωk =
p¯k −
¯
pk
p¯−
¯
p
,
and therefore (16) of Assumption 3 simplifies to
pikx− 12rx2 =
¯
pkx− 12rx2 − (p¯k −
¯
pk)x
K∑
i=k+1
p¯i −
¯
pi
p¯k −
¯
pk
= (p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯)x− 12rx2.
Hence, the parameters pik are
pik = p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯ ∀ k ∈ K,
which satisfy pi1 ≤ · · · ≤ piK and pik ≤
¯
pk for all k ∈ K. In contrast to the buyer’s type p the parameter
pik can be negative for some k ∈ K, depending on the instance parameters and the partition.
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Since φJ(x|λ) = (P + λ)x− 12rx2, the function M∗ stated in Lemma 4 is
M∗(λ) =
{
1
2r (P + λ)
2 if P + λ ≥ 0
0 otherwise
.
For the MO model, we need to realise that for a non-negative seller’s reservation level (M ≤ 0) the
seller’s IR constraint (14) is non-restrictive. This follows from Theorem 7 and the definition of x∗(·|M)
in Lemma 4. More precisely, since φJ(0|
¯
p) = 0 we have xM = 0 for M ≤ 0 and hence the optimal MO
solution is the optimal ME solution. To conclude, the only proper values for M for the MO model are
0 ≤M ≤M∗(
¯
p).
Therefore, we only consider M = βM∗(
¯
p) for some β ∈ [0, 1]. For notational convenience, we often
switch from M to β. We define xβ ≡ xβM∗(¯p) and x∗(·|β) ≡ x∗(·|βM∗(
¯
p)), resulting in
xβ = min
{
x ≥ 0 : φJ(x|
¯
p) ≥ βM∗(
¯
p)
}
= min
{
x ≥ 0 : (P +
¯
p)x− 12rx2 ≥ β 12r (P +
¯
p)2
}
= 1r (1−
√
1− β)(P +
¯
p) ∈ [0, 1r (P +
¯
p)].
Thus, the function x∗ stated in Lemma 4 is
x∗(λ|β) = 1r max
{
(1−
√
1− β)(P +
¯
p), P + λ
}
. (17)
In Corollary 9 we collect and translate the results of Theorems 5, 6, and 7 for the LQU problem.
Corollary 9. For the MM-LQU model, any convex combination of
xk =
1
r (P +
¯
p) ∀ k ∈ K,
xk =
1
r (P +
¯
pk) ∀ k ∈ K,
xk =
1
r max
{
P +
¯
p, P − p¯+ p¯k +
¯
pk
} ∀ k ∈ K,
is an optimal solution. For the ME-LQU model, the only optimal solution is
xk =
1
r max
{
0, P − p¯+ p¯k +
¯
pk
} ∀ k ∈ K. (18)
For the MO-LQU model and M = βM∗(
¯
p) for some β ∈ [0, 1], the only optimal solution is
xk =
1
r max
{
(1−
√
1− β)(P +
¯
p), P − p¯+ p¯k +
¯
pk
}
∀ k ∈ K. (19)
Note that the optimal solutions for the ME and MO models are unique due to the strict concavity of
φJ(·|λ) (the details are given in the proof of Corollary 9). Furthermore, for certain instances the optimal
ME solution (18) results in no trade with a range of buyer types (those for which P − p¯+ p¯k +
¯
pk ≤ 0).
Consequently, the seller’s worst-case net utility is zero for such instances. It might be preferable to
always trade with a potential buyer to at least make some revenue, even if this results in a potentially
lower expected net utility. This is exactly what happens with the optimal MO solution (19) for β > 0:
the optimal MO menu always instigates trade with the buyer if β > 0. A similar result is observed in
Zheng et al. (2015) for their concave setting with infinitely many contracts.
We can use Corollary 9 to illustrate a difference between the approach of Zheng et al. (2015) and our
MO model. If we translate the results of Zheng et al. (2015) to our pooling setting, their multi-objective
approach could lead to a discontinuity at β = 1 (the equivalent to their  = 1) in xk as function of β.
This is due to the fact that their approach leads to the MM model if β = 1, which has multiple optimal
solutions, as seen in Corollary 9. In contrast, the MO solution is always unique and continuous in β.
Finally, for β = 0 the optimal MO solution is the optimal ME solution. Similarly, for β = 1 the
optimal MO solution is the (unique) optimal MM solution that also maximises the seller’s expected net
utility as a two-stage optimisation process. For this reason, we focus completely on the MO model in
the results to come.
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3.3 Normalising the objective function
To construct an optimal menu of contracts, the seller has to decide on his reservation level M (or
equivalently β), the number of contracts K offered, and the partition of the buyer types. To quantify the
effect of these decisions, we need to express the optimal objective function value in terms of the stated
decisions. We can simply substitute (19) in the objective function (13), but it turns out to be useful to
normalise various parameters as follows. First, we redefine the partition as
¯
pk =
¯
p+ δk−1(p¯−
¯
p) and p¯k =
¯
p+ δk(p¯−
¯
p),
where δ0 = 0, δk ∈ [0, 1] for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, and δK = 1. For a proper K-partition, we have
0 = δ0 < · · · < δK = 1. Consequently, ωk = δk − δk−1. Second, we introduce the normalisation factor ν
and the aggregate instance parameter α:
ν =
2r
(p¯−
¯
p)2
> 0 and α =
p¯−
¯
p
P +
¯
p
> 0.
As we will show, the (relative) performance measures of interest can be expressed completely in terms
of α, β, and δk (k ∈ K). The normalisation factor ν is used to simplify the expressions and cancels out
in relative measures.
Let ΓK be the optimal MO objective value when using a proper K-partition, i.e., using (19). We can
express the normalised optimal MO objective value νΓK in terms of the introduced normalised/aggregate
parameters, see Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. For any proper K-partition the normalised optimal MO-LQU objective value is given by
νΓK =
kβ∑
k=1
(δk − δk−1)
(
β
α2 + 2(δk + δk−1 − 1)(1−
√
1− β) 1α
)
+
K∑
k=kβ+1
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1 − 1
)2
, (20)
where kβ is the largest index affected by the seller’s reservation level:
kβ = max
{
0,max
{
k ∈ K : δk + δk−1 < 1− 1α
√
1− β
}}
.
Notice that kβ < K, since δK = 1. Furthermore, for instances with α ∈ (0,
√
1− β] ⊆ (0, 1] we have
kβ = 0, implying that the seller’s reservation level is non-restrictive for all contracts.
Two extreme cases are νΓ1 = α
−2 and the limit of νΓK for K → ∞ using any sensible partition
(such as δk = k/K):
νΓ∞ =
∫ δβ
0
(
β
α2 + (4δ − 2)(1−
√
1− β) 1α
)
dδ +
∫ 1
δβ
(
1
α + 2δ − 1
)2
dδ,
where δβ corresponds to the limit of kβ :
δβ = max
{
0, 12 (1− 1α
√
1− β)
}
.
Hence, we get
νΓ∞ =
{
1
α2 +
1
3 if α ≤
√
1− β
β
α2 +
1
6 (1 +
1
α
√
1− β)3 if α > √1− β
. (21)
Notice that Γ∞ is independent of the partition, as should be the case since we are effectively offering
infinitely many contracts. Trivially, we have ΓK ≤ Γ∞ for any α, β, K, and partition. Hence, we can use
Γ∞ as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of the chosen partition scheme. Recalling the objective
of the MO model, a natural choice for the partition is the one which maximises the seller’s expected net
utility ΓK . For the LQU problem we are able to determine this optimal partition, as we will show in the
next section.
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3.4 Optimal partition
The goal of this section is to determine closed-form formulas for the partition that maximises ΓK (or
equivalently νΓK) for a given α, β, and K. As mentioned in Kerkkamp et al. (2017) and Wong (2014), it
seems to be difficult to determine such closed-form formulas in general, either due to complex system of
equations needed to be solved or due to the existence of multiple local optima. However, the structure
of the LQU problem allows us to determine closed-form formulas for the optimal partition.
First, we prove that offering the same contract multiple times is suboptimal and that we should use
all available contracts. This is intuitively clear, but formalised in Lemma 11.
Lemma 11. The optimal MO-LQU partition satisfies kβ ∈ {0, 1} and 0 = δ0 < δ1 < · · · < δK−1 <
δK = 1.
Lemma 11 greatly restricts the value of kβ when determining the optimal partition, making the
analysis manageable. We can now derive the optimal MO partition, see Theorem 12.
Theorem 12. For 0 < α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β the optimal MO-LQU partition satisfies kβ = 0 and is the
equidistant partition:
δoptk =
k
K ∀ k ∈ K.
For α > KK−1
√
1− β the optimal MO-LQU partition satisfies kβ = 1 and is
δoptk = 1− K−k2K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β) ∀ k ∈ K.
In particular, for β = 1 the equidistant partition is suboptimal for all α > 0.
Sketch of the proof. Since kβ ∈ {0, 1} by Lemma 11 we only need to consider two variants for the
formula of νΓK . For each variant we set the gradient to zero, leading to systems of linear equations after
simplification, and determine the corresponding maximiser. The maximiser must be in line with the
considered value of kβ , resulting in a specification of a valid range of instances: either 0 < α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β
or α > KK−1
√
1− β. These ranges are disjoint and capture all instances α > 0, which completes the
proof.
The result in Theorem 12 (and its proof) is a generalisation of the derived optimal partition in
Kerkkamp et al. (2017). A remarkable property is that the equidistant partition is optimal for a range of
instances, as specified by the relation between α, β, andK. This range of instances increases if β decreases
(by lowering the seller’s reservation level) or if K decreases (by offering less contracts). Moreover, if the
equidistant partition is not optimal, then the optimal partition can be found by increasing δ1 and
partitioning the remaining subinterval [δ1, 1] equidistantly for δ2, . . . , δK−1.
When using the optimal partition the expression for νΓK (20) can be simplified to a similar expression
as (21). This is shown in Corollary 13.
Corollary 13. For the optimal partition the normalised optimal MO-LQU objective value (20) is
νΓoptK =
{
1
α2 +
1
3
(
1− 1K2
)
if α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β
β
α2 +
2
3
K(K−1)
(2K−1)2 (1 +
1
α
√
1− β)3 if α > KK−1
√
1− β . (22)
Notice that (22) clearly converges to (21) if K →∞, as should be the case. Also, on certain intervals
νΓoptK and νΓ∞ either differ by a constant −1/(3K2) or by a factor 4K(K − 1)/(2K − 1)2 in the cubic
term. In the next section, we analyse the relative difference between ΓoptK and Γ∞ in more detail to
obtain performance guarantees.
3.5 Performance guarantees
In this section we analyse the performance of the optimal menu of contracts when using the optimal
partition. We consider two performance measures: the pooling performance (Section 3.5.1) and the
reservation level performance (Section 3.5.2). Both measure the effectiveness of pooling the buyer types
compared to offering infinitely many contracts in their own way. In particular, the first measure is useful
when the seller’s reservation level cannot be adjusted, whereas the second is insightful when the seller’s
reservation level is a decision variable.
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3.5.1 Pooling performance
The pooling performance ΓoptK /Γ∞ is the fraction of the seller’s expected net utility attained by offering
K contracts instead of infinitely many contracts. Here, the seller uses the optimal menu of contracts and
the optimal partition, as derived in Sections 3.2 and 3.4. In other words, it measures how much is lost
due to the pooling of the buyer types by offering a limited number of contracts. Note that the seller’s
reservation level M (or β) must always be satisfied by both menus corresponding to ΓoptK and Γ∞.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the attained pooling performance for two example instances in terms of β
and K. Here, we use α = 2 and α = 94 +
3
4
√
5 ≈ 3.927. We have chosen for α = 2 because this is the
threshold value in (22) for K = 2 and β = 0. The reason for the other chosen instance will be given in
the next section. We observe in Figure 1 that for β = 0 the pooling performances are 88% (K = 2) and
96% (K = 3) for both instances. As β increases the pooling performance increases. However, the rate of
increase differs significantly between K = 2 and K = 3, and between the two instances. Finally, notice
that for fixed K ∈ {2, 3} and for any 0 < β ≤ 1 the pooling performance is higher for α = 2 than for the
other instance.
Figure 1: Pooling performance for the MO-LQU model with the optimal partition, where α is fixed to
α1 = 2 or α2 =
9
4 +
3
4
√
5.
By analysing expressions (21) and (22) for Γ∞ and Γ
opt
K , respectively, we can generalise the above
observations. Furthermore, we are able to derive guarantees for the pooling performance, see Theorem 14.
Theorem 14. For the optimal partition the MO-LQU pooling performance ΓoptK /Γ∞ is continuous and
non-increasing in α, and continuous and non-decreasing in β. In particular, we have the tight pooling
performance guarantee
ΓoptK
Γ∞
≥ 4K(K − 1)
(2K − 1)2 ∀α > 0, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. (23)
Sketch of the proof. The idea is to consider all cases that occur based on (21) and (22). Analysing the
closed-form and manageable formula for each case leads to the following insights.
• For K = 1 we have ddα Γ1Γ∞ < 0 for all α > 0.
• For K > 1 we have
– if β = 0: ddα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
< 0 for 0 < α < KK−1 and
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= 0 for α ≥ KK−1 ,
– if 0 < β ≤ 1: ddα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
< 0 for all α > 0.
• We have ddβ
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= 0 for 0 < α ≤ √1− β and ddβ
ΓoptK
Γ∞
> 0 for α >
√
1− β.
Hence, for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 we obtain a tight pooling performance guarantee by taking the limit α→∞,
resulting in (23). The full proof is given in Appendix C.
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In Figure 2 we show the attained pooling performance for various choices of α, β, and K. The
aggregate instance parameter α increases when the seller’s utility per unit of sold product P decreases
or when the buyer’s type interval [
¯
p, p¯] widens (under certain conditions). We can interpret the first case
(decreasing P ) as a higher investment risk in products, since a product provides less utility. The second
case (widening [
¯
p, p¯]) can be interpreted as an increase in uncertainty on the buyer’s identity. Hence,
Theorem 14 implies that an increase in investment risk or in the uncertainty on the buyer’s identity has
a negative effect on the pooling performance.
In contrast, increasing the seller’s reservation level (encoded in β) has a positive effect on the pooling
performance, provided that the seller’s reservation level is restrictive (α >
√
1− β). However, if we want
to give a guarantee for the pooling performance that holds for any instance, then this positive effect has
no influence. In fact, the seller’s reservation level does not affect the pooling performance guarantee.
This follows from the proof of Theorem 14, where we show that the guarantee (23) is tight for any
0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Table 1 shows the values of this guarantee for K = 1, . . . , 5.
From Figure 2 and Table 1 we can conclude that the seller should not offer a single contract due
to poor pooling performance in general. In contrast, offering two contracts already leads to a pooling
performance guarantee of 88% and offering three contracts results in 96%. Recall that for β = 0 the
MO model is equivalent to the ME model. Therefore, the bounds for β = 0 correspond to the results in
Kerkkamp et al. (2017) and Wong (2014). Our analysis shows that the same bounds hold for the MO
model for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Thus, the pooling of buyer types leads to a simpler menu of contracts and can
be done with a controllable loss in the seller’s expected net utility.
Figure 2: Attained pooling performance
ΓoptK /Γ∞ for the MO-LQU model with the op-
timal partition.
K Tight lower bound
for ΓoptK /Γ∞
1 0
2 0.888
3 0.960
4 0.979
5 0.987
∞ 1
Table 1: Pooling performance guarantees
for the MO-LQU model with the optimal
partition.
3.5.2 Reservation level performance
The reservation level performance ΓoptK /Γ
β=0
∞ is similar to the pooling performance, except that the used
benchmark Γβ=0∞ disregards the seller’s reservation level. That is, the numerator Γ
opt
K depends on β
as before, but the denominator Γβ=0∞ always uses β = 0. In particular, Γ
β=0
∞ is the seller’s maximum
attainable expected net utility over all β and K. We can use the reservation level performance to quantify
how much expected net utility is lost by the seller’s reservation level, again in terms of the number of
contracts offered.
We first consider the attained reservation level performance for two example instances, see Figure 3.
As before, we use α = 2 and α = 94 +
3
4
√
5 ≈ 3.927. Realise that for β = 0 the reservation level
performance and the pooling performance are the same. In contrast to the pooling performance, the
reservation level performance decreases when β increases, as seen in Figure 3. We observe that for α = 2
the performance is less sensitive to changes in β for low values of β compared to the other instance. For
both instances there is a steep decrease in performance when β approaches 1, i.e., when the seller fully
considers his worst-case utility.
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Figure 3: Reservation level performance for the MO-LQU model with the optimal partition, where α is
fixed to α1 = 2 or α2 =
9
4 +
3
4
√
5.
Similar to Theorem 14, we are able to generalise the above observations and determine guarantees for
the reservation level performance. These results are shown in Theorem 15, where the term ‘unimodal’
refers to being non-increasing at first and then non-decreasing.
Theorem 15. For the optimal partition the MO-LQU reservation level performance ΓoptK /Γ
β=0
∞ is con-
tinuous and unimodal in α, and continuous and non-increasing in β. In particular, we have the tight
reservation level performance guarantee
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
≥ 8K(K − 1)
(
4K(K − 1) + (2K − 1)√2K2 − 2K + 1 + 1)(
6K(K − 1) + (2K − 1)√2K2 − 2K + 1 + 1)2 ∀α > 0, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. (24)
Sketch of the proof. We need to consider all cases that occur based on (21) and (22). By analysing each
case, we obtain the following results.
• For K = 1 we have ddα Γ1Γβ=0∞ < 0 and
d
dβ
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for all α > 0.
• For K > 1 we have
– if β = 0: ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
< 0 for 0 < α < KK−1 and
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for α ≥ KK−1 ,
– if 0 < β ≤ 1: ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
< 0 for 0 < α < α∗, ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for α = α∗, and ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
> 0 for
α > α∗,
– ddβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for 0 < α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β and ddβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
< 0 for α > KK−1
√
1− β.
Here, the minimiser α∗ is defined for K > 1 and 0 < β ≤ 1 by
α∗ = 1 +
(2K(K − 1) + 1)β + (2K − 1)
√
β
(
2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β) + β)
2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β) , (25)
which satisfies α∗ > 1 and α∗ > KK−1
√
1− β if it exists.
Therefore, the reservation level performance guarantee is zero for K = 1 and for K > 1 it follows by
taking β = 1 and evaluating the performance for α = α∗. The full proof is given in Appendix C.
Note that in Figures 1 and 3 the example instance with α = 94 +
3
4
√
5 corresponds to the minimiser
(25) for K = 2 and β = 1. The attained reservation level performance for various choices of α, β, and
K is depicted in Figure 4. For β = 0 the reservation level performance and the pooling performance
are equivalent (see also Figure 2). For 0 < β ≤ 1 there is a unique minimiser for the reservation level
performance, namely α∗ stated in (25). Hence, for any given β we can easily determine the minimum
reservation level performance. We omit the verbose exact expressions, simply use (21), (22), and (25).
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Instead, we depict the resulting minima in Figure 5, which are tight reservation level performance
guarantees for each 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
In Figure 5 the values for β = 0 correspond to (23) and the values for β = 1 to (24). As seen in
Figure 5, the reservation level performance guarantee decreases more rapidly for larger values of β. These
guarantees are also given in Table 2 for certain choices of K and β. For example, increasing β from 0 to
3
4 leads to approximately the same percentage point decrease in the guarantee as increasing β from
9
10
to 1. Furthermore, notice that even with infinitely many contracts (K =∞) it is not always possible to
obtain full reservation level performance. If we let K →∞, then the bound in (24) is
8+4
√
2
11+6
√
2
≈ 0.7009.
In other words, with infinitely many contracts the seller obtains at least 70% of the maximum expected
net utility if he first maximises his worst-case net utility (β = 1) and this bound can be attained
depending on the instance. Similarly, when using two (three) contracts, the seller achieves at least 64%
(68%) when first maximising his worst-case net utility, and these bounds can be attained (see Table 2).
Lowering the seller’s reservation level raises these guarantees. For example, for β = 12 these are 83%,
89%, and 92% for K equal to 2, 3, and ∞, respectively.
Overall, we conclude that the seller’s reservation level has a significant impact on the seller’s expected
net utility, irrespective of the number of contracts offered. In terms of pooling performance, increasing the
seller’s reservation level has a positive effect, whereas it has a negative effect in terms of the reservation
level performance. In any case, the seller should always offer at least two contracts in order to have a
reasonable reservation level performance guarantee.
Figure 4: Attained reservation level perfor-
mance ΓoptK /Γ
β=0
∞ for the MO-LQU model with
the optimal partition.
Figure 5: Tight reservation level performance
guarantees in terms of β for the MO-LQU
model with the optimal partition.
K Tight lower bound for ΓoptK /Γ
β=0
∞
β = 0 β = 12 β =
3
4 β =
9
10 β = 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0.888 0.834 0.788 0.742 0.647
3 0.960 0.895 0.842 0.790 0.682
4 0.979 0.912 0.857 0.802 0.691
5 0.987 0.919 0.863 0.808 0.695
∞ 1 0.929 0.872 0.816 0.700
Table 2: Reservation level performance guarantees for the MO-LQU model with the optimal partition.
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4 Concluding remarks
When faced with a continuum [
¯
p, p¯] of buyer types, the seller can pool the buyer types to obtain a
simpler menu of finitely many contracts. We analysed a pooling approach where the seller partitions
the set of types [
¯
p, p¯] a priori into K ∈ N≥1 subintervals [
¯
pk, p¯k] for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The resulting menu
consists of K contracts and is designed such that the types in the k-th subinterval [
¯
pk, p¯k] choose the
k-th contract in the menu. In addition to pooling, we considered multiple objective functions for the
seller: he maximises either his minimum net utility, his expected net utility, or a combination of both
(resulting in a multi-objective approach). We modelled the multi-objective approach by maximising the
seller’s expected net utility under the additional constraint that his minimum net utility must be at least
his reservation level. Here, the seller’s reservation level is an additional model parameter decided by the
seller.
Our analysis shows that under commonly used assumptions the three considered pooling models have
tractable reformulations and that the optimal menus are maxima of certain modified joint net utility
functions. In particular, the maximum obtainable minimum net utility is the maximum joint net utility
with respect to the lowest buyer type
¯
p. Using this property, the seller can fine-tune his reservation level
in the multi-objective pooling model to balance his expected and worst-case net utility. Effectively, the
multi-objective model encompasses the other models. With this model the seller can, for example, first
maximise his minimum net utility, followed by his expected net utility (as a two-stage approach).
The considered pooling models depend on the chosen partition scheme and the seller’s reservation
level. We considered a contracting problem with quadratic utilities to quantify the effect of these decisions
made by the seller. For this problem we first derived the optimal partition scheme, which then led to
manageable formulas for the corresponding optimal objective value. In turn, these formulas can be used
to determine various performance measures. We note that these results are analytical/exact and hold
for any number of contracts.
We focussed on two performance measures. The first is the pooling performance, which is the obtained
expected net utility by offering K menus compared to infinitely many contracts. It quantifies purely the
effect of pooling the buyer types. The second is the reservation level performance, which is the obtained
expected net utility compared to ignoring the seller’s reservation level and using infinitely many contracts.
Here, the benchmark is the highest attainable expected net utility over all seller’s reservation levels and all
number of contracts. Both measures have been fully analysed, which resulted in performance guarantees
(lower bounds) in terms of the number of contracts K offered. For example, offering a single contract
has poor performance (in both measures) and is ill-advised. In contrast, offering two, three, or infinitely
many contracts leads to a pooling performance guarantee of 88%, 96%, and 100%, respectively. The
corresponding reservation level performance guarantees are 64%, 68%, and 70%, respectively. Note that
the latter guarantees are overall bounds and can be made more specific for a fixed seller’s reservation
level. In particular, a reservation level near the maximum feasible value is costly in performance. All
mentioned bounds can be attained for certain instances and are therefore tight.
From our analysis, we conclude that pooling of buyer types results in a simpler menu of contracts
and any loss in performance can be controlled by the number of contracts offered. High performance can
already be achieved with up to five contracts. Furthermore, a multi-objective optimisation approach can
be performed by including the seller’s reservation level as a decision parameter. The seller’s reservation
level has a significant impact on the seller’s expected net utility, irrespective of the number of contracts
offered. Increasing the reservation level has a positive effect on the pooling performance, but a negative
effect on the reservation level performance. Therefore, the seller has to balance his expected and worst-
case net utility and can use the stated performance measures to justify his choices.
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A Proofs of Section 2
This appendix contains the proofs of the results in Section 2. We note that certain proofs are similar to
or generalisations of those found in Kerkkamp et al. (2017).
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we show the necessity of x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK . Suppose xk > xk+1 for some
k, k + 1 ∈ K and consider (2) between contracts k with
¯
pk and k + 1 with
¯
pk+1. Adding both IC
constraints leads to
φB(xk|
¯
pk)− φB(xk+1|
¯
pk) ≥ φB(xk|
¯
pk+1)− φB(xk+1|
¯
pk+1).
Since
¯
pk <
¯
pk+1, this contradicts (9) of Assumption 1. Hence, x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK must hold.
Second, we show sufficiency of 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK . Let x ∈ RK≥0 be non-decreasing and set z ∈ RK to
zk = φB(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) ∀ k ∈ K. (26)
It remains to check feasibility of (x, z). Fix k ∈ K and pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k]. For l ∈ K with k < l we have
zk − zl (26)= φB(xk|
¯
pk)− φB(xl|
¯
pl) +
l−1∑
i=k
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
)
=
l∑
i=k+1
(
φB(xi−1|
¯
pi)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
)
(9)
≤
l∑
i=k+1
(φB(xi−1|pk)− φB(xi|pk)) = φB(xk|pk)− φB(xl|pk).
Likewise, let l ∈ K with l < k, then
zk − zl (26)= φB(xk|
¯
pk)− φB(xl|
¯
pl)−
k−1∑
i=l
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
)
=
k∑
i=l+1
(
φB(xi|
¯
pi)− φB(xi−1|
¯
pi)
)
(9)
≤
k∑
i=l+1
(φB(xi|pk)− φB(xi−1|pk)) = φB(xk|pk)− φB(xl|pk).
Hence, all IC constraints (2) hold. Furthermore, we have
φB(xk|pk)− zk
(2)
≥ φB(x1|pk)− z1
(8)
≥ φB(x1|
¯
p1)− z1 (26)= 0.
Thus, all IR constraints (1) are satisfied and the solution is feasible.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let x ∈ RK≥0 be feasible, i.e., there exists a z ∈ RK such that (x, z) satisfies (1)-(3)
and for the MO model also (7). The proof consists of two parts: first we show that (10) holds for contract
k = 1 and then for the other contracts in the menu (k > 1).
First, realise that for an optimal z at least one IR constraint (1) must hold with equality. If this is
not the case, we can increase all zk by adding some  > 0 until at least one IR constraint is tight. This
new solution is still feasible, as (2) only considers the difference zk− zl, which is unaffected. For the MO
model (7) would trivially still hold. Moreover, the objective value of the new solution is strictly larger
for the ME, MM, and MO models. Hence, if no IR constraint is tight we have a contradiction.
Now, suppose that z1 < φB(x1|
¯
p1), then for k ∈ K we have for all pk ∈ [
¯
pk, p¯k] that
φB(xk|pk)− zk
(2)
≥ φB(x1|pk)− z1
(8)
≥ φB(x1|
¯
p1)− z1 > 0.
The result implies that no IR constraint is tight, which is suboptimal as argued above. Hence, for an
optimal z it must hold that z1 = φB(x1|
¯
p1).
Second, fix k ∈ K with k > 1 and consider the following IC constraints (2) between contracts k and
k − 1:
φB(xk|p¯k−1)− φB(xk−1|p¯k−1) ≤ zk − zk−1 ≤ φB(xk|
¯
pk)− φB(xk−1|
¯
pk).
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Since p¯k−1 =
¯
pk, this implies that
zk − zk−1 = φB(xk|
¯
pk)− φB(xk−1|
¯
pk).
Using our earlier result that z1 = φB(x1|
¯
p1), we obtain the following formula:
zk =
k∑
i=2
(
φB(xi|
¯
pi)− φB(xi−1|
¯
pi)
)
+ φB(x1|
¯
p1),
which can be rewritten into (10).
Proof of Theorem 3. We use Lemmas 1 and 2 to eliminate the variable z. The equivalent MM model
follows immediately. The ME model becomes
max
0≤x1≤···≤xK
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) )
.
Collecting all xk terms results in the stated formulation, where we use that ωk > 0 for all k ∈ K. Finally,
the MO model follows by combining these insights.
Proof of Lemma 4. By Assumption 2 the maximum of x 7→ φJ(x|λ) is attainable for any λ ∈ R. Thus,
M∗ is well-defined and non-decreasing since (8) holds by Assumption 1. Next, for M ≤ M∗(
¯
p) the
threshold xM is well-defined. By Assumptions 1 and 2, we can construct the stated function x∗(·|M) by
selecting the smallest maximiser (if there are multiple). There is a technicality in this argument, which
we discuss at the end of this proof. We continue with the proof of the non-decreasingness of x∗(·|M).
Suppose the constructed x∗(·|M) is not non-decreasing, then there exist λ < µ with x∗(λ|M) > x∗(µ|M).
By definition of the smallest maximiser, we have
φJ(x
∗(λ|M)|λ) > φJ(x∗(µ|M)|λ),
φJ(x
∗(µ|M)|µ) ≥ φJ(x∗(λ|M)|µ).
Adding both inequalities and cancelling common terms leads to
φB(x
∗(λ|M)|λ)− φB(x∗(µ|M)|λ) > φB(x∗(λ|M)|µ)− φB(x∗(µ|M)|µ),
which contradicts (9) of Assumption 1.
The technicality regarding the existence of x∗(·|M) is as follows. We have to show that φJ(·|λ) always
has a maximum on [xM ,∞) for any M ≤M∗(
¯
p) and any λ ∈ R. First, for M = −∞ we have xM = 0 and
Assumption 2 guarantees the existence of the maximum. Hence, the non-decreasing function x∗(·| −∞)
exists. For notational convenience, let x∗(λ) = x∗(λ| −∞). Second, xM ≤ x∗(
¯
p) for any M ≤M∗(
¯
p) by
definition. This implies that x∗(λ|M) = x∗(λ) for λ ≥
¯
p, i.e., the restriction to x ≥ xM has no effect for
λ ≥
¯
p. For λ <
¯
p we have that for x ≥ x∗(
¯
p)
φJ(x|λ)− φJ(x∗(
¯
p)|λ)
(9)
≤ φJ(x|
¯
p)− φJ(x∗(
¯
p)|
¯
p) ≤ 0.
Here, the last inequality follows from the fact that x∗(
¯
p) maximises φJ(·|
¯
p) by definition. Thus, the
maximum of φJ(·|λ) on [xM ,∞) (if it exists) must be attained in the closed interval [xM , x∗(
¯
p)]. By
Assumption 2 this maximum exists.
Proof of Theorem 5. First, we use induction to prove that the solution xk = x
∗(
¯
pk) for k ∈ K is optimal.
Then, we show that the resulting optimal objective value can also be attained using a menu with only a
single contract.
In order to do so, we need the following insight. Suppose xk+1 = x
∗(
¯
pk+1) and compare the k-th and
(k + 1)-th terms of (12). We claim that these two terms satisfy
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) ≤M∗(
¯
pk+1)−
k∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
)
,
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where we have substituted xk+1 = x
∗(
¯
pk+1), resulting in the term M
∗(
¯
pk+1). The common terms cancel
out in this expression, leading to
φJ(xk|p¯k) ≤M∗(
¯
pk+1).
Since p¯k =
¯
pk+1, this inequality holds by definition of M
∗(
¯
pk+1), which proves our claim. This implies
that if xk+1 = x
∗(
¯
pk+1) the (k + 1)-th term does not affect the objective value and can be omitted in
(12). Hence, if xl = x
∗(
¯
pl) for all l > k for some k ∈ K, we only need to consider the first k terms of
(12) for the remaining optimisation problem.
We continue with the induction proof that x∗(
¯
pk) is optimal. First, we relax the feasibility constraint
x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK . Second, notice that xK only appears in the K-th term in (12). Therefore, we can
optimise xK independently for this term and optimally set xK = x
∗(
¯
pK). Third, suppose that for some
k ∈ K we have xl = x∗(
¯
pl) for all l > k. The remaining optimisation problem has decision variables
x1, . . . , xk. By the above mentioned insight, we only need to consider the first k terms of (12). As such,
xk only appears in the k-th term of (12) and we can optimise xk independently as seen before. This
results in xk = x
∗(
¯
pk). By induction, we end up with xk = x
∗(
¯
pk) for all k ∈ K, which is optimal for the
relaxed problem as the induction proof shows. Since x∗ is non-decreasing by definition, xk = x∗(
¯
pk) is
also feasible and optimal for the MM model.
Finally, by using the above mentioned insight it follows that for this optimum only the first term
(k = 1) of (12) affects the objective value. Hence, the resulting optimal objective value is M∗(
¯
p). The
same objective value is attained by offering a single contract with order quantity x = x∗(
¯
p), which does
not depend on K or the partition of [
¯
p, p¯].
Proof of Theorem 6. Relax the feasibility constraint x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xK in (11) to obtain a separable opti-
misation problem for each k ∈ K. By Assumption 3, the solution xk = x∗(pik) for k ∈ K is optimal for
this relaxed problem. Since pik ≤ pik+1 and x∗ is non-decreasing by definition, we have that xk ≤ xk+1
for all k ∈ K. Therefore, the relaxed optimum is feasible for the ME model and thus optimal.
Proof of Theorem 7. Since
¯
p1 =
¯
p and xM is the smallest value such that φJ(x|
¯
p) ≥M , constraint (14)
for k = 1 implies x1 ≥ xM . Now relax all feasibility constraints (14)-(15), but add the implied constraints
xk ≥ xM for k ∈ K. By definition, xk = x∗(pik|M) for k ∈ K is an optimal solution for the resulting
separable optimisation problem.
It remains to verify that the proposed solution is also feasible for the MO model. Notice that
0 ≤ xM ≤ x∗(pi1|M) ≤ · · · ≤ x∗(piK |M) by definition of x∗(·|M) and since pik ≤ pik+1 for all k ∈ K.
Thus, we need to check if (14) holds for all k ∈ K.
First, notice that pik ≤
¯
pk must hold for all k ∈ K by the assumptions. The proof is as follows.
By (8) and (16) we have φB(·|pik) ≤ φB(·|
¯
pk). If pik >
¯
pk, then the previous result and (8) imply
φB(·|pik) = φB(·|
¯
pk), which trivially violates (9). In fact, pik <
¯
pk must hold for all k ∈ K \ {K}: if
pik =
¯
pk for some k < K then (16) implies φB(·|p¯k) = φB(·|
¯
pk), which again trivially violates (9).
Second, we show a useful implication of the definition of x∗(·|M). For some k ∈ K, consider any
order quantity x¯ with xM ≤ x¯ ≤ xk = x∗(pik|M). By definition of xk = x∗(pik|M), we have
φJ(xk|pik) ≥ φJ(x¯|pik). (27)
Since pik ≤
¯
pk and x¯ ≤ xk, we have
φJ(xk|
¯
pk) = φS(xk) + φB(xk|pik) +
(
φB(xk|
¯
pk)− φB(xk|pik)
)
(27)
≥ φS(x¯) + φB(x¯|pik) +
(
φB(xk|
¯
pk)− φB(xk|pik)
)
(9)
≥ φS(x¯) + φB(x¯|pik) +
(
φB(x¯|
¯
pk)− φB(x¯|pik)
)
= φJ(x¯|
¯
pk).
Finally, the above result with k = 1 and x¯ = xM shows that (14) holds for k = 1:
φJ(x1|
¯
p1) ≥ φJ(xM |
¯
p1) ≥M.
Likewise, using the above result for k ∈ K and x¯ = xk−1 gives
φJ(xk|
¯
pk) ≥ φJ(xk−1|
¯
pk).
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Subtracting (φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)) for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 from both sides leads to
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) ≥ φJ(xk−1|
¯
pk−1)−
k−2∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
)
.
These are the left-hand sides of (14) for k and k − 1. Repeatedly applying this result for k, k − 1, . . . , 1
gives
φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) ≥ φJ(x1|
¯
p1) ≥M,
where we have derived the last inequality earlier. Hence, (14) holds for all k ∈ K. We conclude that that
xk = x
∗(pik|M) is feasible for the MO model and therefore optimal.
Proof of Corollary 8. We can rewrite the MM model into
max
x,u
u,
s.t. φJ(xk|
¯
pk)−
k−1∑
i=1
(
φB(xi|p¯i)− φB(xi|
¯
pi)
) ≥ u, ∀ k ∈ K,
xK ≥ · · · ≥ x1 ≥ 0.
This is a concave optimisation problem by the additional assumption of this corollary, hence any convex
combination of optimal solutions is also optimal. It remains to verify that all stated solutions are optimal
for the MM model. The first two stated menus are optimal for the MM model as shown in Theorem 5. The
third stated menu is also feasible and optimal for the MM model by construction, due to Assumption 3
and the choice of M = M∗(
¯
p). See the proof of Theorem 7 for additional details regarding feasibility.
B Examples that satisfy Assumption 3
In this appendix, we give an example problem class that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 3. Consider a
buyer with utility function given by φB(x|p) ≡ ψ(x) + pχ(x), where the functions ψ : R≥0 → R and
χ : R≥0 → R≥0 do not depend on the type p. Furthermore, χ is strictly increasing and non-negative.
Finally, ω is a (strictly positive) continuous distribution with a non-decreasing hazard rate. We show
that the stated assumptions hold for this problem class.
We first verify that Assumption 1 holds, i.e., (8) and (9). For λ ≤ µ ∈ R and x ≥ 0 we have
φB(x|λ)− φB(x|µ) = (λ− µ)χ(x) ≤ 0,
since χ is non-negative. For λ < µ ∈ R and 0 ≤ x < x′ we get
φB(x
′|λ)− φB(x|λ)− φB(x′|µ) + φB(x|µ) = (λ− µ)(χ(x′)− χ(x)) < 0,
as χ is strictly increasing. Thus, Assumptions 1 is satisfied.
Next, we show that Assumption 3 holds. In order to define pik, we need to consider (16):
φB(x|pik) = φB(x|
¯
pk)−
(
φB(x|p¯k)− φB(x|
¯
pk)
) K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
= ψ(x) +
(
¯
pk − (p¯k −
¯
pk)
K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
)
χ(x).
Hence, pik is the coefficient of χ(x) in the above expression:
pik ≡
¯
pk − (p¯k −
¯
pk)
K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
∀ k ∈ K.
Notice that pik <
¯
pk for k ∈ K \ {K} and piK =
¯
pK . In order to have pi1 ≤ · · · ≤ piK and thus
Assumption 3 to hold, we need conditions on the probability distribution ω. As stated, we assume that
ω has a non-decreasing hazard rate, which implies that
ω(v)
1− ∫ v
¯
p
ω(p)dp
≥ ω(u)
1− ∫ u
¯
p
ω(p)dp
∀u, v ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], u ≤ v,
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or equivalently
1
ω(u)
∫ p¯
u
ω(p)dp ≥ 1
ω(v)
∫ p¯
v
ω(p)dp ∀u, v ∈ [
¯
p, p¯], u ≤ v.
Since ω is assumed to be continuous, by the Mean Value Theorem there exist pˆk ∈ (
¯
pk, p¯k) for k ∈ K
such that
ω(pˆk) =
1
p¯k −
¯
pk
∫ p¯k
¯
pk
ω(p)dp =
ωk
p¯k −
¯
pk
.
We now have for k ∈ K that
pik − pik+1 =
¯
pk − (p¯k −
¯
pk)
K∑
i=k+1
ωi
ωk
−
¯
pk+1 + (p¯k+1 −
¯
pk+1)
K∑
i=k+2
ωi
ωk+1
=
p¯k+1 −
¯
pk+1
ωk+1
K∑
i=k+2
ωi −
p¯k −
¯
pk
ωk
K∑
i=k
ωi
=
1
ω(pˆk+1)
∫ p¯
p¯k+1
ω(p)dp− 1
ω(pˆk)
∫ p¯
¯
pk
ω(p)dp
<
1
ω(pˆk+1)
∫ p¯
pˆk+1
ω(p)dp− 1
ω(pˆk)
∫ p¯
pˆk
ω(p)dp ≤ 0.
Here, the first inequality follows from ω(p) > 0 for all p ∈ [
¯
p, p¯] and the last inequality from the non-
decreasing hazard rate. Hence, pik < pik+1 for all k ∈ K and Assumption 3 is satisfied.
C Proofs of Section 3
In this appendix we give all proofs of the results in Section 3. We note that certain proofs are similar to
or generalisations of those found in Kerkkamp et al. (2017).
Proof of Corollary 9. First, the optimal ME and MO solutions follow from Theorems 6 and 7, and the
optimal MM solutions from Corollary 8. Second, since the function x 7→ φJ(x|λ) for the LQU problem is
strictly concave and differentiable for any λ ∈ R, it has a unique maximiser. From the relaxations used
in the proofs of Theorems 6 and 7 it follows that the stated optima are the only optima.
Proof of Lemma 10. Consider the optimal MO solution (19). The first term in the maximisation corre-
sponds to the case where the seller’s reservation level is restrictive for contract k ∈ K. This is the case
if
(1−
√
1− β)(P +
¯
p) > P − p¯+ p¯k +
¯
pk
⇐⇒ (1−
√
1− β)(P +
¯
p) > P +
¯
p+ (δk + δk−1 − 1)(p¯−
¯
p)
⇐⇒ (1−
√
1− β) 1α > 1α + (δk + δk−1 − 1)
⇐⇒ 1− 1α
√
1− β > δk + δk−1.
Since δk + δk−1 < δk+1 + δk for all k ∈ K, we can determine the largest index affected by the seller’s
reservation level:
kβ = max
{
0,max
{
k ∈ K : δk + δk−1 < 1− 1α
√
1− β
}}
.
Combining our results, the optimal MO objective value is (by recalling Assumption 3)
ΓK =
∑
k∈K
ωkφJ(xk|pik) =
∑
k∈K
ωk
(
(P + pik)xk − 12rx2k
)
= 1r
kβ∑
k=1
ωk
(
(P + pik)(1−
√
1− β)(P +
¯
p)− 12 (1−
√
1− β)2(P +
¯
p)2
)
+ 12r
K∑
k=kβ+1
ωk(P + pik)
2.
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Since (1−√1− β)2 = −β + 2(1−√1− β), (pik −
¯
p)/(p¯−
¯
p) = δk + δk−1 − 1, and
P + pik
p¯−
¯
p
=
P + p¯k +
¯
pk − p¯
p¯−
¯
p
=
P + 2
¯
p− p¯
p¯−
¯
p
+ δk + δk−1 =
1
α
+ δk + δk−1 − 1,
the normalised optimal MO objective value is
νΓK =
kβ∑
k=1
(δk − δk−1)
(
β
α2 + 2(δk + δk−1 − 1)(1−
√
1− β) 1α
)
+
K∑
k=kβ+1
(δk − δk−1)
(
1
α + δk + δk−1 − 1
)2
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 11. Let ∆ be an optimal partition. First, suppose that kβ(∆) ≥ 2. Construct a new
partition ∆ˆ with δˆ1 = δkβ , δˆk = δkβ+1 for 1 < k ≤ kβ , and δˆk = δk otherwise. By construction, we have
kβ(∆ˆ) = 1, since
δˆ1 + δˆ0 = δkβ ≤ δkβ + δkβ−1 < 1− 1α
√
1− β,
δˆk + δˆk−1 ≥ δkβ+1 + δkβ ≥ 1− 1α
√
1− β, for k = 2, . . . ,K.
Here we use the definition of kβ . Since we have
kβ∑
k=1
(δk − δk−1)(δk + δk−1)− (δkβ − δ0)(δkβ + δ0) =
kβ∑
k=1
(δ2k − δ2k−1)− δ2kβ = 0,
it is straightforward to verify that
νΓK(∆)− νΓK(∆ˆ) =
kβ∑
k=1
(δk − δk−1)
(
β
α2 + 2(δk + δk−1 − 1)(1−
√
1− β) 1α
)
− (δkβ − δ0)
(
β
α2 + 2(δkβ + δ0 − 1)(1−
√
1− β) 1α
)
= 0.
Hence, the new partition ∆ˆ is also optimal and we can assume without loss of generality that kβ(∆) ∈
{0, 1}.
Second, suppose that δi−1 = δi < δi+1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. By the first part of this proof,
we know that i+ 1 ≥ 2 > kβ(∆) ∈ {0, 1}. Case I: if kβ < i, then there exists an 0 <  < 1 such that
(1− )δi+1 + (1 + )δi ≥ 1− 1α
√
1− β.
We construct a new partition ∆ˆ with δˆi = (1 − )δi+1 + δi and δˆk = δk otherwise. By construction,
we have δˆi−1 < δˆi < δˆi+1 and kβ(∆ˆ) ≤ kβ(∆) < i. The difference in the resulting normalised optimal
objective value is
νΓK(∆)− νΓK(∆ˆ) = 0 + (δi+1 − δi)( 1α + δi+1 + δi − 1)2
− (δˆi − δˆi−1)( 1α + δˆi + δˆi−1 − 1)2 − (δˆi+1 − δˆi)( 1α + δˆi+1 + δˆi − 1)2
= (δi+1 − δi)( 1α + δi+1 + δi − 1)2
− (1− )(δi+1 − δi)( 1α + (1− )δi+1 + (1 + )δi − 1)2
− (δi+1 − δi)( 1α + (2− )δi+1 + δi − 1)2 < 0.
Here, the inequality follows from the strict convexity of the quadratic function and contradicts the
optimality of ∆. Case II: if kβ = 1 = i, then δ1 = δ0 = 0. Construct a new partition ∆ˆ with δˆ1 = δ2 and
δˆk = δk otherwise. This leads to k
β(∆ˆ) = 0 < kβ(∆) and the same (optimal) objective value. We can
now apply either the previous case or the following cases.
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Finally, suppose 0 = δ0 < · · · < δi−1 < δi = · · · = δK = 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. Notice that
kβ(∆) < i. Case I: if i = 1 and β = 1, then kβ(∆) = 0 and νΓK(∆) = 1/α
2. Construct a new partition
with 0 < δˆ1 < 1 and δˆk = δk = 1 otherwise. This leads to k
β(∆ˆ) = 1 and the following contradiction:
νΓK(∆ˆ) = δˆ1(
1
α2 + 2(δˆ1 − 1) 1α ) + (1− δˆ1)( 1α + δˆ1)2 = 1α2 + (1− δˆ1)δˆ21 > 1α2 = νΓK(∆).
Case II: if i > 1 or β < 1, then there exists an 0 <  < 1 such that
(1− )δi + (1 + )δi−1 ≥ 1− 1α
√
1− β.
Construct a new partition with δˆi = (1− )δi + δi−1 and δˆk = δk otherwise. We have δˆi−1 < δˆi < δˆi+1
and kβ(∆ˆ) = kβ(∆). Consequently, we get the contradiction
νΓK(∆)− νΓK(∆ˆ) = (δi − δi−1)( 1α + δi + δi−1 − 1)2 + 0
− (δˆi − δˆi−1)( 1α + δˆi + δˆi−1 − 1)2 − (δˆi+1 − δˆi)( 1α + δˆi+1 + δˆi − 1)2
= (δi − δi−1)( 1α + δi + δi−1 − 1)2
− (1− )(δi − δi−1)( 1α + (1− )δi + (1 + )δi−1 − 1)2
− (δi − δi−1)( 1α + (2− )δi + δi−1 − 1)2 < 0.
To conclude, an optimal partition ∆ must satisfy kβ(∆) ∈ {0, 1} and 0 < δ1 < · · · < δK−1 < 1.
Proof of Theorem 12. By Lemma 11 we only need to consider the cases kβ = 0 and kβ = 1. Case I:
suppose kβ = 0, then
νΓK =
K∑
k=1
(δk − δk−1)( 1α + δk + δk−1 − 1)2.
This expression is quadratic in δk for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, since the cubic terms cancel out. Setting the
gradient to zero, leads to
(δk+1 − δk−1)(δk+1 + δk−1 − 2δk) = 0, ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}.
Since δk+1 > δk−1 by Lemma 11, δk = 12 (δk+1 +δk−1) must hold. Solving this system of linear equalities,
results in the equidistant partition:
δk =
k
K .
Since kβ = 0, it must hold that
1
K = δ1 = δ1 + δ0 ≥ 1− 1α
√
1− β ⇐⇒ α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β.
Case II: suppose kβ = 1, then
νΓK = δ1
(
β 1α2 + 2(δ1 − 1)(1−
√
1− β) 1α
)
+
K∑
k=2
(δk − δk−1)( 1α + δk + δk−1 − 1)2. (28)
This expression is cubic in δ1 and quadratic in δk for k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}. Setting the gradient to zero
leads to
−3δ21 − 2(δ2 + 2 1α
√
1− β − 2)δ1 + δ22 − 1 + 2 1α
√
1− β − 1−βα2 = 0,
(δk+1 − δk−1)(δk+1 + δk−1 − 2δk) = 0, ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}.
The roots for the first equation are δ1 =
1
3 (δ2 + 1− 1α
√
1− β) and δ1 = 1− δ2− 1α
√
1− β, where the first
root is the largest. The second set of equations are as before, implying δk =
1
2 (δk+1 + δk−1) for k > 1.
By substituting δK = 1 we can express δk as an affine function of δk−1 for k > 1. Consequently, δk is an
affine function of δ1 for k > 1. Hence, after substitution of δk, (28) remains a cubic function in δ1, whose
leading term is −δ31 . We conclude that the optimal value for δ1 is the larger root of the corresponding
derivative.
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The resulting system of linear equations, δ1 =
1
3 (δ2 + 1 − 1α
√
1− β) and δk = 12 (δk+1 + δk−1) for
k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}, has the following solution:
δk = 1− K−k2K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β), ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}.
For this partition to be valid with kβ = 1, we must have
1− K−12K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β) = δ1 = δ1 + δ0 < 1− 1α
√
1− β ⇐⇒ α > KK−1
√
1− β.
Likewise, we have for k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1} that
α > 0 =⇒ 2− 2K−2k+12K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β) = δk + δk−1 ≥ 1− 1α
√
1− β.
This implies that for the partition indeed kβ = 1. Finally, clearly δK−1 < 1, so we only need to verify
that δ1 > 0:
1− K−12K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β) > 0 ⇐⇒ α > K−1K
√
1− β.
Thus, the partition is valid for α > KK−1
√
1− β.
Notice that both cases for kβ are disjoint and cover all possible values of α > 0. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Corollary 13. By Theorem 12, for α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β we have kβ = 0 and δk = k/K. The
expressions (20) simplifies to
νΓoptK =
K∑
k=1
1
K
(
1
α +
2k−1
K − 1
)2
= 1α2 +
1
3
(
1− 1K2
)
.
For α > KK−1
√
1− β we have kβ = 1 and (20) becomes
νΓoptK =
(
1− K−12K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β)
)(
β
α2 − 2K−22K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β)(1−
√
1− β) 1α
)
+
K∑
k=2
1
2K−1 (1 +
1
α
√
1− β)
(
1
α + 1− 2K−2k+12K−1 (1 + 1α
√
1− β)
)2
= βα2 +
2
3
K(K−1)
(2K−1)2 (1 +
1
α
√
1− β)3.
In particular, these expressions converge to (21) as K →∞, as should be the case.
Proof of Theorem 14. Continuity of ΓoptK /Γ∞ is trivially verified by (21) and (22). For readability, we
state the properties that will be proved in the end:
• For K = 1 we have ddα Γ1Γ∞ < 0 for all α > 0.
• For K > 1 we have
– if β = 0: ddα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
< 0 for 0 < α < KK−1 and
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= 0 for α ≥ KK−1 ,
– if 0 < β ≤ 1: ddα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
< 0 for all α > 0.
• We have ddβ
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= 0 for 0 < α ≤ √1− β and ddβ
ΓoptK
Γ∞
> 0 for α >
√
1− β.
We start with the proof for K = 1, which is considered separately to prevent issues with division
by zero. Note that νΓ1 = α
−2 and that there is no partition to optimise in this case. Therefore, for
0 < α ≤ √1− β it is trivial to show that
Γ1
Γ∞
=
3
α2 + 3
,
d
dα
Γ1
Γ∞
= − 6α
(α2 + 3)
2 < 0,
d
dβ
Γ1
Γ∞
= 0.
For α >
√
1− β, we have
Γ1
Γ∞
=
6α
6αβ + (α+
√
1− β)3 .
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The corresponding derivatives are
d
dα
Γ1
Γ∞
= −6(2α−
√
1− β)(α+√1− β)2(
6αβ + (α+
√
1− β)3)2 < 0,
d
dβ
Γ1
Γ∞
=
9α(α−√1− β)2√
1− β (6αβ + (α+√1− β)3)2 > 0,
since α >
√
1− β. Hence, for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 the infimum for the pooling performance is
inf
α>0
Γ1
Γ∞
= lim
α→∞
Γ1
Γ∞
= 0.
We continue with the proof for K > 1. Based on (21) and (22) we need to differentiate three cases.
Case I: for 0 < α ≤ √1− β we have
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= − 6α
K2(α2 + 3)2
< 0,
d
dβ
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= 0.
Case II: for
√
1− β < α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β, which can only occur for 0 ≤ β < 1, we get
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= 6
(K2 − 1)√1− βα4 + 2 ((K2 − 1)β − 1)α3
K2
(
6αβ + (α+
√
1− β)3)2
+ 6
− (K2(β + 2) + 1− β)√1− βα2 +K2(1− β)3/2
K2
(
6αβ + (α+
√
1− β)3)2 . (29)
We claim that (29) is strictly negative on
√
1− β < α < KK−1
√
1− β and that (29) at α = KK−1
√
1− β
is either zero (if β = 0) or strictly negative (if 0 < β < 1). Clearly, the denominator is always strictly
positive. Hence, it is sufficient to focus on the numerator. Let f(α) = c4α
4 + c3α
3 + c2α
2 + c0 denote the
numerator. Recall that K > 1. Since this case cannot occur for β = 1, we have c4 > 0, c3 ∈ R, c2 < 0,
and c0 > 0.
First, by Descartes’ Sign Rule the number of positive real roots of f is bounded by 2, namely by the
number of sign changes in the sequence c4, c3, c2, and c0.
Second, we evaluate the numerator f for certain values for α:
lim
α↓0
f(α) = 6K2(1− β)3/2 > 0, lim
α→∞ f(α) =∞ > 0,
f(
√
1− β) = −24(1− β)3/2 < 0, f
(
K
K−1
√
1− β
)
= −6K
2(K + 1)β(1− β)3/2
(K − 1)3 ≤ 0,
where we use that K > 1 and that this case cannot occur for β = 1. By continuity of f we conclude that
there is a positive real root on (0,
√
1− β) and on [ KK−1
√
1− β,∞).
Thus, f has exactly two positive real roots. If 0 < β < 1 both fall outside of (
√
1− β, KK−1
√
1− β].
Furthermore, since f is strictly negative on the borders of this interval, it is strictly negative on the
entire interval. If β = 0, one of the roots is the border point KK−1 . The same conclusions hold for (29).
Furthermore, using α >
√
1− β we have that the derivative to β is
d
dβ
ΓoptK
Γ∞
=
3α(α−√1− β)2((K2 − 1)α2 + 3K2)
K2
√
1− β (6αβ + (α+√1− β)3)2 > 0.
Case III: for α > KK−1
√
1− β it holds that
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= −6β
(
2α3 + 3
√
1− βα2 − (1− β)3/2)
(2K − 1)2 (6αβ + (α+√1− β)3)2 ≤ 0, (30)
d
dβ
ΓoptK
Γ∞
=
3α(2
√
1− βα3 + 3(2− β)α2 + 6√1− βα+ 2− β2 − β)
(2K − 1)2√1− β (6αβ + (α+√1− β)3)2 > 0,
where we use that α > KK−1
√
1− β > √1− β. Note that (30) is zero if β = 0 and strictly negative if
0 < β ≤ 1.
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We conclude that the derivative of the pooling performance is non-negative (if β = 0) or strictly
negative (if 0 < β ≤ 1) with respect to α in all cases. Hence, the infimum is reached for α→∞:
inf
α>0
ΓoptK
Γ∞
= lim
α→∞
ΓoptK
Γ∞
=
4K(K − 1)
(2K − 1)2 .
Here, the limit trivially follows from (21) and (22). Furthermore, notice that this infimum holds for any
0 ≤ β ≤ 1, implying that this bound is tight for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 15. Continuity of ΓoptK /Γ
β=0
∞ is trivially verified by (21) and (22). For readability, we
make the following claims, which are all proved in the end:
• For K = 1 we have ddα Γ1Γβ=0∞ < 0 and
d
dβ
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for all α > 0.
• For K > 1 we have
– if β = 0: ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
< 0 for 0 < α < KK−1 and
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for α ≥ KK−1 ,
– if 0 < β ≤ 1: ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
< 0 for 0 < α < α∗, ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for α = α∗, and ddα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
> 0 for
α > α∗,
– ddβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0 for 0 < α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β and ddβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
< 0 for α > KK−1
√
1− β.
Here, the minimiser α∗ is defined for K > 1 and 0 < β ≤ 1 by
α∗ = 1 +
(2K(K − 1) + 1)β + (2K − 1)
√
β
(
2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β) + β)
2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β)
and we claim that α∗ > 1 and α∗ > KK−1
√
1− β if it exists.
We first focus on the tight reservation level performance guarantee. Using the above claims, in
particular on the derivative to β, we conclude that it is sufficient to consider β = 1 to derive the tight
guarantee for the reservation level performance. Therefore, we have to consider two cases: K = 1 and
K > 1 with β = 1.
First, consider the case K = 1. We have for 0 < α ≤ 1 that
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
=
3
α2 + 3
,
d
dα
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= − 6α
(α2 + 3)
2 < 0,
d
dβ
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= 0.
Likewise, for α > 1
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
=
6α
(α+ 1)3
,
d
dα
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= −6(2α− 1)
(α+ 1)4
< 0,
d
dβ
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= 0.
Thus, for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 the reservation level performance guarantee is
inf
α>0
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= lim
α→∞
Γ1
Γβ=0∞
= 0. (31)
Second, consider K > 1 and β = 1. We need to discern two cases based on α.
Case I: for 0 < α ≤ 1 we have
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
=
2K(K − 1)α2 + 3(2K − 1)2
(2K − 1)2(α2 + 3) ,
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= − 6(2K
2 − 2K + 1)α
(2K − 1)2 (α2 + 3)2 < 0.
Case II: for α > 1 we get
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
=
4K(K − 1)α3 + 6(2K − 1)2α
(2K − 1)2(α+ 1)3 ,
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 6
2K(K − 1)α2 − (8K2 − 8K + 2)α+ 4K2 − 4K + 1
(2K − 1)2(α+ 1)4 . (32)
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The derivative (32) has roots
α± = 2 +
1± (2K − 1)√2K2 − 2K + 1
2K(K − 1) .
Note that α+ corresponds to α∗ for this case. Evaluating the formula in (32) for α = 1 gives
−3
8
2K(K − 1) + 1
(2K − 1)2 < 0.
Since (32) is a parabola that opens upward, we have α− < 1 < α+. Hence, the reservation level
performance has a minimum at α+. By combining Case I and Case II, we conclude that α+ is the global
minimum for K > 1 and β = 1.
As argued above, for K > 1 the tight reservation level performance guarantee follows from evaluating
ΓoptK /Γ
β=0
∞ at α = α
+ and β = 1, resulting in
inf
0≤β≤1
inf
α>0
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
=
8K(K − 1) (4K(K − 1) + (2K − 1)√2K2 − 2K + 1 + 1)(
6K(K − 1) + (2K − 1)√2K2 − 2K + 1 + 1)2 .
This formula also works for K = 1 (resulting in a value of 0, see also (31)).
It remains to prove all our claims. The proofs for K = 1 have already been given. Therefore, consider
the case K > 1. Unfortunately, the proofs are somewhat tedious work. We have to distinguish four cases.
Case I: for 0 < α ≤ 1 and α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β we have
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= − 6α
K2 (α2 + 3)
2 < 0,
d
dβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0.
Case II: for 1 < α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β the derivatives are
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 6
(K2 − 1)α2 −K2(2α− 1)
K2(α+ 1)4
,
d
dβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 0.
The roots of the derivative to α are KK+1 < 1 and
K
K−1 ≥ KK−1
√
1− β. Notice that the numerator is a
parabola that opens upward. For β = 0 the derivative to α is strictly negative on 1 < α < KK−1 and zero
at α = KK−1 . For 0 < β ≤ 1 it is strictly negative on the entire interval 1 < α ≤ KK−1
√
1− β.
Case III: for KK−1
√
1− β < α ≤ 1 we get
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= −6K(K − 1)
√
1− β (α4 − (β + 2)α2 + (1− β))+ (2K2 − 2K + 1)βα3
(2K − 1)2α2 (α2 + 3)2 . (33)
Let f be the numerator of (33). For β = 0 this case cannot occur. For β = 1 the function f simplifies
to a cubic function with roots α = 0. Hence, it follows trivially that (33) is strictly negative for α > 0.
For 0 < β < 1 it holds that f(α) < 0 on α > 0 if and only if
g(α) = −6α4 − 62K
2 − 2K + 1
K(K − 1)
β√
1− βα
3 + 6(β + 2)α2 − 6(1− β) < 0 ∀α > 0,
where the quartic function g differs from f by a positive factor. Let the quartic function h be defined by
h(α) = −6α4 − 12 β√
1−βα
3 + 6(β + 2)α2 − 6(1− β).
Since (2K2 − 2K + 1)/(K(K − 1)) > 2 for K > 1, we have g(α) < h(α) for all α > 0. The discriminant
of h is zero. By using well-known properties of quartic formulas we conclude that h has two distinct real
roots and one double real root. The shape of h now follows from evaluating it for certain points:
lim
α→−∞h(α) = −∞ < 0, h(−1) = 12β
(
1 + 1√
1−β
)
> 0, h(0) = −6(1− β) < 0.
This trivially implies that h(α) ≤ 0 for all α > 0 by evaluating all possible shapes of h. Thus, g(α) < 0,
f(α) < 0, and (33) is strictly negative for all α > 0.
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The derivative to β is given by
d
dβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= −3K(K − 1)α
2 − (2K2 − 2K + 1)√1− βα+K(K − 1)(1− β)
(2K − 1)2√1− βα(α2 + 3) , (34)
which has roots K−1K
√
1− β and KK−1
√
1− β (both smaller than the considered α). Note that the
numerator of (34) is a parabola that opens downward. Hence, (34) is strictly negative.
Case IV: for α > KK−1
√
1− β and α > 1 it holds that
d
dα
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= 6
2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β)α2 − ((4K2 − 4K + 2)β + 4K(K − 1)(1−√1− β))α
(2K − 1)2(α+ 1)4
+ 6
−2K(K − 1)(1− β)3/2 + 2K(K − 1)(1 + β) + β
(2K − 1)2(α+ 1)4 . (35)
If β = 0, then (35) is always equal to zero. For β > 0 the numerator of (35) is a parabola that opens
upward with roots
α± = 1 +
(
2K(K − 1) + 1)β ± (2K − 1)√β(2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β) + β)
2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β) .
We claim that α+ is a local minimiser for the reservation level performance, which turns out to be the
global minimiser by checking all other cases. This claim is proved by showing that α− < 1 < α+ and,
if needed, that α− < KK−1
√
1− β < α+. This implies that (35), with a parabola that opens upward as
numerator, is strictly negative for α < α+, zero at α = α+, and strictly positive for α > α+. Hence, α+
is a local minimiser.
We continue to prove our claim. Evaluating (35) for α = 1 results in the value
−3
8
β
2K(K − 1)(1−√1− β) + 1
(2K − 1)2 < 0.
This implies that α− < 1 < α+. If KK−1
√
1− β ≤ 1 the proof for this case if complete. Otherwise,
K
K−1
√
1− β > 1 or equivalently
β <
2K − 1
K2
.
Evaluating (35) for α = KK−1
√
1− β gives
−6(K − 1)
3((K + 1)β − 2K(1−√1− β))
(K(1 +
√
1− β)− 1)4 , (36)
which is zero only if β = 0 or if β = 4K(K+1)2 and strictly negative in between these values. Since
2K−1
K2 =
4K
(K+1)2 only if K = 1 (excluding negative values), we conclude that we are considering β
satisfying
0 < β <
2K − 1
K2
<
4K
(K + 1)2
.
For such β the value (36) is strictly negative. This implies that α− < KK−1
√
1− β < α+, completing the
proof for this case.
The derivative to β is
d
dβ
ΓoptK
Γβ=0∞
= −6K(K − 1)α
2 − (2K2 − 2K + 1)√1− βα+K(K − 1)(1− β)
(2K − 1)2√1− β(α+ 1)3 , (37)
with roots K−1K
√
1− β and KK−1
√
1− β (both smaller than the considered α). As seen before, the
numerator is a parabola that opens downward, which implies that (37) is strictly negative.
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